We propose a quantum bit-commitment scheme based on quantum one-way permutations with the unconditionally binding and computationally concealing property. Our scheme reduces exponentially the number of bits which the receiver needs to store until the opening phase compared with the classical counterpart.
scheme can either be defeated by Alice or Bob as long as both have unrestricted quantum computational power.
This does not exclude the study on quantum bit-commitment based on some quantum computational assumption. Generally speaking, a bit-commitment based on the computational assumption comes in two flavors: (1) statistically (unconditionally) concealing and computationally binding, and (2) statistically (unconditionally) binding and computationally concealing. Informally, statistically concealing means that Bob cannot obtain more than a negligible amount of information about the committed string. Statistically binding means that whatever Alice does it is impossible to open both Xl and x2 with non-negligible probability of success.
Recently, Dumais, Mayers, and Salvail proposed a quantum bitcommitment scheme based on any quantum one-way permutation. 4) This scheme is unconditionally concealing and computationally binding, and reduces the number of interaction and the total amount of communication compared with the classical counterpart proposed by Noar, Ostrovsky, Venkatesen, and Young/)
There are several measures for the cost of communication, the number of interactions, the total number of bits communicated, and so on. In this paper, we focus on the number of bits which Bob needs to store until the opening phase. We consider this as crucial in the quantum setting, since Bob must protect the received quantum states against decoherence until the opening phase. For some practical application, the length between the committing phase and the opening phase could be several years. We will propose a quantum bit-commitment scheme based on quantum one-way permutations with the unconditionally binding and computationally concealing property. Our scheme reduces exponentially the number of bits which Bob needs to store (i.e., Alice sends) compared with the classical counterpart (e.g. see the textbook by Schneierg)). In particular, in order to commit an n-bit classical string, Bob needs to store only an O((log n)3) -bit quantum string in our method, while an n-bit string in the classical method. (all logarithms in this paper are base two.) Our protocol is based on a standard classical bit-commitment method and the quantum fingerprinting scheme proposed by Buhrman, Cleve, Watrous, and de Wolf) ) Organization After giving some preliminaries in Section 2, we will describe our protocol along with the property concerning efficiency in Section 3. Section 4 provides the proofs that our protocol is unconditionally binding and computationally concealing. This paper will be concluded in Section 5. Hard to invert For any probabilistic polynomial time Quantum Turing machine Adv, any polynomial poly(n), and all sufficiently large n,
The probability is taken over the distribution of x, the (classical) coin flips of Adv, and quantum observation of Adv. Note that all variables in this definition are classical strings.
We can also define the non-uniform version of this notion, in which Adv is defined as polynomial-size quantum circuits by Dumais, Mayers, and Salvail. 4) Next, we review the quantum fingerprinting proposed by Buhrman, Cleve, Watrous, and de Wolf, 2) which can distinguish any two distinct classical strings with high probability by using much shorter fingerprints associating them. It should be mentioned that they do not investigate their fingerprinting method in respect of security.
Suppose that for fixed c > 1 and 5 < 1 we have an error-correcting code a reasonable choice of such codes, which give 5 < 9/10 + 1/(15c) for any chosen c>2. Distinguishing Ihx} and lhy) can be done with one-sided error probability by the procedure that measures and outputs the first qubit of the state 
(H | I)(controlled -SWAP)(H | I)lO> Ir Ir
Measuring the first qubit of this state produces outcome 1 with probability 2 21(r This probability is 0 if x = Y and is at least (1 -5 2) > 0 if 1 2 x # y. Thus, the test determines which case holds with one-sided error ~ (1 + ~ ).
The error probability of this test can be reduced to any e > 0. This can be done by making the fingerprint k = O(log(1/e)) times and from such fingerprints, one can independently perform the test k times, resulting in an error probability below e. In this case, the length of each fingerprint is O((log n)(log(1/e))).
w Protocol
In this section, we describe our protocol. Let E = {a n : {0,1} n --+ {0, 1} n I n > @} be a family of quantum one-way permutations, and E = {e n : {0, 1} '~ -* {0, 1} m [ n > 0} a family of error-correcting codes mentioned above. The commitment scheme takes, as common input, the number of bits to be committed (a security parameter) n, and the descriptions of family ~ and E. Our protocol is based on a standard classical bit-commitment method and the quantum fingerprinting scheme described above.
Given n, ~, and E (with fixed c and 6), Alice and Bob determine the instances a n : {0, 1} n --~ {0, 1} n E N and e n : {0, 1} ~ -+ {0, 1} m C E. Fix also k = (logn) 2.
Committing
1. Alice decides a classical string x E {0, 1} n to be committed.
Alice computes a~(x), and then e~(an(X)).

Alice makes k copies of the quantum state [r
li>le?(an(z))>,
and sends them to Bob.
Notice that Bob must protect the received quantum state, k copies of Ir agMnst decoherence until the opening phase. In the committing phase, only Alice sends the information to Bob, and there is no interaction. The length of the string which Alice sends in this phase is The computation that Alice needs in this phase is one evaluation of the one-way function a n, one evaluation of the coding function e n. Alice also needs to make k copies of the quantum state [r Each Ir can be obtained by logm operations of the Hadamard transform, and one one-bit addition corresponding to writing e~(on(x)).
Opening
1. Alice sends x' to Bob. (x' is supposed to be x.) 2. Bob computes an(x'), and then en(an(x')). 
Ir -
and tests ]r and [r by the controlled-swap method described above. 4. Bob determines whether Ir are consistent with x or not.
In the opening phase, again, only Alice sends the information to Bob, and there is no interaction. The string which Alice sends in this phase is a classical string of length n.
The computation that Bob needs in this phase is that Alice needs in the committing phase plus the controlled-swap tests and the final decision. Each controlled-swap test requires 2 operations of the Hadamard transform, one controlled-swap operation, and one observation.
w Binding and Concealing
In this section, we show that our bit-commitment scheme is statistically binding and computationally concealing. First, we consider the binding condition. Thus, we regard Alice as an adversary, and define So(n) and Sl(n) as the probabilities that Alice succeeds to unveil Xl and x2, respectively.
As mentioned in the paper by Dumais, Mayers, and Salvail, 4) when considering adversarial Alice in the classical setting, one can always fix Alice's committed string by fixing the content of her random tape, i.e., we can require that either the probability to unveil 0 or the probability to unveil 1 vanishes, for every fixed value of the random tape. This kind of definition of binding does not apply in the quantum setting, since Alice could introduce randomness in the quantum computation even if we fix the random tape. In particular, Alice can always commit to a superposition of x0 and xl by preparing the quantum state:
where [~0> and I1>1~1> are the honest states generated for committing to x0 and xl respectively, and 10) and 11> are two orthogonal states of an extra ancilla kept by Alice. In this case, Alice can unveil x0 and xl with some non zero probability, i.e., So(n) > 0 and Sl(n) > 0.
The binding condition that S0(n) = 0 or Sl(n) = 0 is too strong was previously noticed by Mayers, 6~ and Dumais, Mayers, and SalvaiP ~ proposed the weaker condition So(n) + S~(n) < 1 + ~(n), where r is negligible (i.e. smaller than 1/poly(n) for any polynomial poly(n)). In this paper, we also follow this condition, and call a bit-commitment scheme statistically binding if it satisfies this condition. This definition is also taken by the paper by Cr6peau, L6gar6, and Salvail. z~ Theorem 4.1 Our bit-commitment protocol is statistically binding, i.e., it satisfies S0(n) + S1 (n) < 1 + c(n), where c(n) is negligible.
Proof
Without loss of generality, consider Alice wants to open both xl and x2 (x2 xl). In the opening phase of our protocol, after Bob receives a classical string x ~ from Alice, he makes the quantum state I~b) by himself. This quantum state must corresponds to some codeword. In particular, when Bob receives xl (x2) in the opening phase, he makes the quantum state Ir (1~2}) corresponding to a codeword en(o'n(xl)) (en(crn(x2))).
Because of this, Alice has to send a quantum state Ir close to both two codewords en(an(xl)) and en(a~(x2)) in the committing phase. In particular, 1 1 11
Alice has to send tr that the probabilities ~--~-I(r162 and 88 -1<r162
are both negligible. This implies I(r162 = lZ-e(n)and 1(r162 = ~1 -e(n), while 1(r162 -< (L Since 6 < 1 is a fixed constant, this a contradiction. One might be concerned with the situation that [r are entangled. As mentioned in the paper by Watrous, 1o) a simple analysis reveals that entanglement among Ir sent by Alice can yield no increase in the probability of success on the attack as compared to the situation in which these strings are not entangled, and that the probability of error is bounded by the tail of a binomial series as expected. 9
Next, we consider the concealing condition. Thus, we regard Bob as an adversary.
Theorem 4.2
Our bit-commitment protocol is computationally concealing.
Proof
In the committing phase, Bob has the quantum state [r sent by Alice with a committed string x. Observe that, from Ir Bob can extract the information no more than the configuration of Ir as the formula:
~ li)lyd,
where yi c {0, 1}. Notice that the coding function employed in our method is not quantum one-way. Thus, Bob can compute an (x) by decoding the codeword YlY2""Ym. Thus, attacking an(x) to get x with non-negligible probability success implies the ability to compute x from an(x) with non-negligible probability.
w Conclusion
As we have seen, our method is efficient with respect to the number of interaction, the total communication cost and the computation cost. Especially, our protocol reduces exponentially the number of bits which Bob needs to store compared with the classical counterpart. In particular, in order to commit an n-bit classical string, Bob needs to store only an O((log n)3)-bit quantum string in our method, while an n-bit string in the classical method.
